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INTRODUCTION 
On its face, Rule 23(b )(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
seems tailor-made for lawsuits against government.1 Rule 23(b)(2) 
allows a class action when "the party opposing the class has acted or 
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby 
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding 
* Thanks to Professor David Super of the University of Maryland School of Law for 
suggesting the topic and for his continuing guidance. Thanks also to Professor Margaret 
Berger of Brooklyn Law School and Professor Nina Mendelson of the University of 
Michigan Law School for their helpful ideas. 
1. See FED. R. CJV. P. 23(b)(2). 
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declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. "2 This situation 
arises frequently in people's dealings with government agencies: 
recipients of public benefits and consumers using public utilities, for 
example, constitute large groups of people all subject to identical 
government policies who might seek injunctive relief.3 
Litigants attempting to invoke Rule 23(b )(2) against government 
agencies have encountered an unforeseen obstacle, however, often 
referred to as the "necessity doctrine." Many courts have declined to 
certify classes when "[n]o useful purpose would be served by 
permitting [the] case to proceed as a class action. "4 These denials of 
class certification are premised on the idea that all putative plaintiffs 
would benefit from a favorable finding and the resulting injunctive or 
declaratory relief, and thus class certification is unnecessary. For 
example, one court denied class certification because "[t]he court 
could reasonably assume the good faith of a defendant such as the 
Chief Clerk of a state court especially given his express willingness to 
follow the court's injunction."5 Dependen�e on the good faith of the 
defendant creates a problem for future potential litigants. If rulings 
are limited to the individual litigants in the case, those who are not 
parties to the original lawsuit cannot invoke the judgment, but must 
instigate new proceedings if the defendant does not adhere to the 
ruling. Particularly for people whose resources and access to the legal 
system are limited, the costs of beginning new proceedings can be 
prohibitive.6 In addition, even litigants with the resources to begin new 
proceedings can encounter difficulties enforcing judgments against 
government entities.7 
The necessity doctrine has great geographical acceptance, and at 
first glance appears fairly well-entrenched. Courts in most of the 
federal circuits have permitted the use of the necessity doctrine.8 
2. Id. 
3. See, e.g., Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976), 
rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (utilities); Almendares v. Palmer, 222 F.R.D. 324 
(N.D. Ohio 2004) (food-stamp benefits). 
4. Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 409 
U.S. 815 (1972). 
5. Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1357 (1st Cir. 1985). 
6. For a discussion of the problems of potential class members who have difficulty 
accessing the legal system, see Daan Braveman, Class Certification in State Court Welfare 
Litigation: A Request for Procedural Justice, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 57, 73-79 (1979). 
7. See infra Part II for more on the difficulties for individual litigants. 
8. See, e.g. , Kansas Health Care Ass'n v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 
1536, 1548 (10th Cir. 1994); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 
1978); Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686-87 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd 
on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City 
of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d 
Cir. 1973); Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as moot, 
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A few circuits have accepted some form of the doctrine, but have 
limited it to situations in which the defendant promises to apply the 
ruling broadly or the nature of the ruling would make it automatically 
apply broadly.9 In other circuits, the status of the doctrine is unclear.10 
Only the Seventh Circuit has completely rejected the necessity 
doctrine, arguing that such analysis has no place in Rule 23 
jurisprudence.11 Courts of appeals may be reluctant to overturn the 
necessity doctrine because it has been applied for a long time.12 In 
addition, the Supreme Court has not shown interest in resolving the 
split, 13 and the Advisory Committee did not address this issue in recent 
amendments to Rule 23.14 
Still, the widespread acceptance of the necessity doctrine among 
appellate courts does not mean that its application is universal. Several 
district courts in circuits that accept the necessity doctrine have 
utilized their discretion and declined to apply the necessity doctrine.1 5  
409 U.S. 815 (1972); Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 78 (D.D.C. 1995); Lucky v. Bd. 
of Regents, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 986, 993 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
9. See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985); Boyland v. Wing, No. 92-
CV-1002, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7496 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2001). 
10. See Baca! v. SEPTA, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 707 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Nehmer v. 
United States Veterans' Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
11 .  E.g., Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1978). Early in the history of 
the necessity doctrine, two student notes contended that the necessity doctrine did not 
constitute an appropriate reading of Rule 23. See Michael J. Murphy & Edwin J. Butterfoss, 
Note, The "Need Requirement": A Barrier to Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2), 67 GEO. 
L.J. 1211 (1979); Richard S. Talesnick, Note, The Necessity Doctrine: A Problematic 
Requirement for Certification of Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1025 
(1980). Still, the Seventh Circuit alone rejects the doctrine. 
12. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) ("[A] decision to 
overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was 
wrongly decided."). 
13. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978). In Craft, 
although no writ of certiorari was sought on the issue of class certification, the Supreme 
Court did consider, sua sponte, the issue of mootness, which would have been avoided had a 
class been certified. Id. The Court noted that "[s]ince the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
District Court's refusal to certify a class, the existence of a continuing 'case or controversy' 
depends entirely on the claims of respondents." Id. at 8. The Court did not take this 
opportunity to make any comment at all about the propriety of the denial of class 
certification. See id. The Court has similarly declined to comment on the necessity doctrine 
in other cases. For example, in Northern States Power Co. v. Ihrke, 409 U .S. 815 (1972), the 
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot but did not consider whether a class should have 
been certified to avoid mootness. Overruling the denial of class certification would have 
avoided the mootness problem, but the Supreme Court did not consider the issue. See 
Murphy & Butterfoss, supra note 11 ,  at 1230. 
14. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Mar. 27, 2003), at http:// 
www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv03p.pdf. 
15. See, e.g., D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-03-2489, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5189, at *42-45 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) (discussing limitations on the Second 
Circuit's acceptance of the doctrine); Almendares v. Palmer, 222 F.R.D. 324, 334 (N.D. Ohio 
2004) (discussing limits on the Sixth Circuit's approach); Baca! v. SEPTA, 4 Am. Disabilities 
Cas. (BNA) 707 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (discussed infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text). 
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Indeed, two circumstances suggest that district courts should limit the 
application of the necessity doctrine: the inability of plaintiffs to 
invoke offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel against government 
agencies, 16 and the tendency of agencies to decline to apply adverse 
circuit court rulings to nonlitigants, a practice known as 
"nonacquiescence."17 Both of these factors make it less certain that 
people who are not parties to the initial litigation will be able to 
benefit from a ruling unless a class is certified. 
This Note argues that district courts should rarely, if ever, refuse to 
certify classes based on the necessity doctrine, even in circuits which 
have endorsed it. Part I argues that class certification is necessary to 
ensure that class-wide relief will be available. Part I I  argues that 
ensuring the availability of relief with sufficiently broad scope is 
particularly critical because of its benefits for putative class members, 
noting in particular the relevance of the inability of plaintiffs to use 
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government and agency 
nonacquiescence. 
I. C LASS CERTIFICATION AND THE SCOPE OF THE JUDGMENT 
The most critical distinction between class actions and individual 
lawsuits is the relief granted by the court. In class actions, judicial 
relief affects a large number of people, whereas judgments in 
individual actions usually impact only the parties to the litigation. 
Courts invoking the necessity doctrine have held that class 
certification is not necessary in some cases because broad injunctive 
relief can be granted without class certification.18 This argument has 
two major flaws. First, as shown in Section I.A, defendants seek to 
avoid class certification largely to avoid a remedy with broad 
16. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984). Under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, once a court decides something against a party in one lawsuit, it is given 
conclusive effect in subsequent lawsuits. Id. at 158. Nonmutual collateral estoppel, in which 
the party that seeks to invoke collateral estoppel was not a party to the original lawsuit, was 
approved by the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of 
Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant 
from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another 
action against the same or a different party. Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when 
a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously 
litigated unsuccessfully in another action against the same or a different party. 
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159 n.4. 
17. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz I); 
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Jntracircuit 
Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831 (1990) [hereinafter Estreicher & Revesz II). 
18. See, e.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 
F.2d 1 121 (10th Cir. 1973). 
1022 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1018 
application. Because defendants may use the necessity doctrine as a 
pretext for limiting the reach of the final judgment, district courts 
should be wary of denying class certification based on the assumption 
that injunctive relief will apply broadly anyway. Second, as argued in 
Section l.B, district courts are not well-positioned at the time of the 
decision on class certification to predict what sort of relief will be 
appropriate. Thus, although appellate courts have approved the 
necessity doctrine in cases in which district courts had already granted 
class-wide relief without class certification, district courts cannot know 
ahead of time that class certification will be unnecessary. 
A. Impact on the Scope of Relief 
Class certification may truly be unnecessary in cases in which the 
ruling will be broadly applicable even without certification. In Dajour 
B. v. City of New York, 19 the district court limited the scope of the 
necessity doctrine to circumstances in which the government 
acknowledged that the ruling would be broadly applicable. 20 Because 
the government contested the applicability of the ruling to the broad 
class, the court did not apply the necessity doctrine.21 This limitation of 
the necessity doctrine seems sensible, although it leaves open the 
question of the binding force of the government acknowledgment.22 
Still, the government's purported willingness to promise to apply the 
ruling broadly calls into question why the doctrine is invoked at all. If 
class certification would not affect the scope of relief, why should the 
government oppose it? This Section suggests that opposition to class 
certification really stems from a desire to limit the scope of relief, and 
that district courts should therefore not apply the necessity doctrine 
unless they can be sure it will not limit the scope of the relief granted. 
Assuming it will not affect the scope of the defendant's liability, 
class certification actually benefits the defendant.23 If a case is certified 
as a class action and the defendant prevails, the defendant prevents all 
class members from relitigating; in an individual action, the defendant 
19. No. 00 Civ. 2044, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15661 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2001). 
20. Dajour B., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15661, at *34-35. 
21. Id. at *34. 
22. See infra Section II.B for more discussion of the effect of government promises. 
23. See Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose 
Interest?, 63 B.U. L. REV. 597, 597-98 (1983) (contending that in "social reform" cases 
certified under Rule 23(b )(2), the certification of a class benefits the defendant rather than 
the plaintiff). Professor Wilton gives "efforts to challenge statutes or governmental 
regulations as unconstitutional, as well as school desegregation cases, prison and mental 
hospital reform cases, and employment discrimination cases" as examples of "social reform" 
cases in which plaintiffs might seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 601 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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only estops the parties to the litigation.24 Thus, class certification 
protects defendants in cases in which class-like relief could be 
granted.25 The potential harm to defendants if no class is certified is 
not merely hypothetical. For example, in Lewis v. New Mexico 
Department of Health,26 the government sought to prohibit "class 
action-like" relief on the ground that no class had been certified.27 The 
court allowed class-wide relief notwithstanding the failure to certify a 
class, citing, among other cases, the case in which the Tenth Circuit 
accepted the necessity doctrine.28 This type of ruling allows the 
plaintiff to obtain class-wide relief, but does not give the defendant an 
opportunity to bind the entire class because due process concerns 
prevent the defendant from using the ruling against new plaintiffs. 29 
The procedural posture of Lewis merits some attention. The court 
invoked the necessity doctrine in a ruling that favored the plaintiff not 
at the class certification phase of the proceedings, but rather when 
granting class-wide relief through summary judgment.30 The 
government defendants opposed the ruling, and thus had a strong 
incentive to argue that the necessity doctrine was inapposite: only if 
class certification was necessary could the government contend that 
failure to certify a class was sufficient grounds for overturning the 
relief granted.31 These arguments are exactly reversed from the 
arguments typically made at the class certification stage, where the 
plaintiff wants to certify a class and the defendant argues that the 
necessity doctrine applies and therefore that certifying a class is not 
necessary. 
24. For a discussion of the merits of class actions for defendants, see generally id. To 
guarantee this benefit for defendants, the drafters of Rule 23 required that plaintiffs seek 
class certification at the beginning of the case if broad relief was contemplated. FED. R. C1v. 
P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee's notes (1966). The Advisory Committee's notes forbid the 
practice of "one-way intervention," through which putative plaintiffs would intervene in the 
case only after a favorable decision on the merits. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory 
committee's notes (1966); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(l) advisory committee's notes (2003) 
("The authority to amend an order under Rule 23(c)(l) before final judgment does not 
restore the practice of 'one-way intervention' that was rejected by the 1966 revision of Rule 
23."). 
25. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 603-04. 
26. 275 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (D.N.M. 2003). 
27. Lewis, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1346. 
28. Id. (citing Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 1973)). 
29. Wilton, supra note 23, at 622-23. The decision will of course still have an effect on 
future litigation as stare decisis. Still, there are ways to obtain a j udgment in the face of 
adverse precedent which are not available in the face of res judicata. See id. at 625-26. 
30. See Lewis, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47. 
31. See id. at 1346 (citing government's argument that class-like relief was inappropriate 
because the case had not proceeded as a class action). 
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Why the change of heart? Only one explanation attributes 
consistent and logical mindsets to each party.32 At each stage, the 
defendant seeks to limit the scope of any judgment that may be issued, 
while the plaintiff seeks to expand its scope. At the class certification 
stage, this means the plaintiff wants class certification and the 
defendant does not. Once a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is issued 
and the case has already proceeded without class certification, the 
defendant attempts to limit the scope of the judgment by arguing that 
a judgment should not have wide application unless the class was 
certified. The plaintiff argues that a judgment with wide application is 
permissible without class certification. 
This explanation suggests that the critical feature of class 
certification is its impact on the scope of the relief granted. The other 
features of class certification have modest impacts by comparison. The 
characteristics that make class actions significantly more time­
consuming -notice and opportunity to opt out -apply only to Rule 
23(b )(3) class actions in which a group of individual claims is at issue.33 
The features that attach to Rule 23(b )(2) class actions -a description 
of the members of the class in any judgment that ensues,34 court 
approval of settlements,35 and appointment of class counsel36 -are all 
necessary requirements for cases that will affect a large number of 
people.37 Further, the burden on defendants from these requirements 
is minimal. 38 
32. But see Wilton, supra note 23, at 603 (suggesting that defendants are behaving 
irrationally when they oppose class certification). Professor Wilton's explanation, unlike the 
argument that defendants consider the scope of relief at each stage, is unappealing because it 
implies that defendants are consistently making strategic errors, which is particularly 
unlikely for government defendants who are likely to be relatively sophisticated. 
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court 
must direct to class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances . . . .  [T]he 
court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion. "). Confusion between 
these requirements and the more modest requirements of Rule 23(b )(2) may cause some of 
the opposition to Rule 23(b )(2) class actions. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 640. 
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). 
35. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(e). 
36. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(g). 
37. Wilton, supra note 23, at 636 ("[A]bsent dissenting interests can effectively be 
protected only if class treatment is approved. "); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46 
(1940) (expressing concerns about absent interests being protected). 
38. Careful description of the class members should not burden defendants at all. 
Appointment of class counsel for plaintiffs similarly places no burden on defendants. Court 
approval of settlements could limit the defendant's ability to settle the case, but is necessary 
to protect absent class members. See supra note 37. 
March 2005) There ls Always a Need 1025 
B. The Influence of Procedural Posture 
As illustrated in the previous Section, decisions about applying the 
necessity doctrine should be made with reference to the scope of the 
relief that will eventually be granted. This fact limits the utility of 
appellate decisions on the necessity doctrine. Appellate courts 
reviewing class certifications know what relief the district court 
granted,39 and take the relief granted into account in deciding whether 
class certification was truly necessary.40 In addition, appellate courts 
know whether the case proceeded in a manner typical of the class or in 
a manner specific to an individual claim.41 At the time of class 
certification, district courts are not privy to this information. 
Section B.1 observes that appellate courts routinely make 
reference to this additional information in making their decisions. 
Section B.2 argues that because district courts lack information, 
particularly information regarding the scope of relief granted, they 
cannot apply the necessity doctrine in the same way and thus should 
be more inclined to certify classes. Section B.3 argues that district 
courts in every circuit retain discretion to certify classes, and that 
doing so does not contradict appellate approval of the necessity 
doctrine. 
39. The appellate case law on the necessity doctrine comes not from interlocutory 
appeals but rather from appeals after the case has been fully decided on the merits. See, e.g., 
Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985); Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Galvan v. 
Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121. 1122 
(10th Cir. 1973); Ihrke v. N. States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 1972), vacated as 
moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). There are several possible explanations for this trend. Before 
1998, when Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) was promulgated allowing interlocutory 
appeals on the issue of class certification at the discretion of the courts of appeals, denials of 
class certification were not appealable as of right to appellate courts. See Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 465 (1978); FED. R. C1v. P. 23(f); 523 U.S. 1221 (1998) 
(adding Rule 23(f)). In addition, appellate courts are unlikely to use their discretion to 
decide necessity doctrine cases even when interlocutory appeal is available. The claim of a 
court invoking the necessity doctrine is that class certification will make no difference, 
suggesting that appellate review is less urgent. Further, the procedures that attach when a 
class is certified under Rule 23(b )(2) are much less significant than the procedures that 
attach when classes are certified under Rule 23(b)(3) and numerous monetary claims are 
joined, again suggesting that immediate appellate review is less critical. See FED. R. Civ. P. 
23(c)(2)(B) (imposing additional requirements only on Rule 23(b)(3) class actions). 
40. See, e.g., Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1127 (10th Cir. 1973) (discussed 
infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text). 
41. See, e.g., Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussed infra notes 
67-71 and accompanying text). 
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1. Procedural Posture in the Appellate Court 
In two circuits that accept the necessity doctrine, the Tenth 42 and 
the Second,43 the leading cases made very explicit use of information 
available only to the appellate court. Both courts emphasized that 
class certification was not necessary to provide the relief that was 
eventually granted.44 In Martinez v. Richardson,45 the Tenth Circuit 
held that "a class action was not demanded here because the same 
relief could be afforded without its use and seemingly the [district] 
court had something of this kind in mind" when it allowed for further 
enforcement action.46 The appellate court emphasized in its order that 
the trial court should make sure of future compliance.47 The trial court 
complied, issuing an order which applied to "all those Medicare 
beneficiaries similarly situated."48 Over a decade later, a new plaintiff, 
not a party to the original lawsuit, reactivated the court's order and 
obtained an order to show cause.49 Similarly, in Galvan v. Levine,50 the 
Second Circuit upheld a class-wide injunction that had been issued in 
the absence of a certified class, noting that "what is important ... is 
that the judgment run to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs 
but of all others similarly situated. "51 
The First Circuit's approach to the necessity doctrine in Dionne v. 
Bouley52 brings the importance of knowing what relief was granted 
into even sharper focus. In Dionne, the First Circuit held that the 
necessity doctrine should not be "mechanical," and that "the 
justification for denying class certification rests on the particular 
circumstances."53 The Dionne case involved a challenge to Rhode 
Island's procedure for issuing "Writs of Attachment" which froze 
bank accounts or seized assets.54 The circuit court affirmed a denial of 
42. See Martinez, 472 F.2d at 1 127. 
43. See Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973). 
44. See Martinez, 472 F.2d at 1 127; Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261. 
45. 472 F.2d 1 121 (10th Cir. 1973). 
46. Martinez, 472 F.2d at 1127. 
47. Id. (ordering the trial court to "fashion an appropriate decree or order so as to make 
certain that there will be future compliance with the law in order that persons in the dire 
straits which these plaintiffs were in are not cut off without a hearing"). 
48. Martinez v. Bowen, 655 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D.N.M. 1986) (quoting trial court's order 
after remand). 
49. Id. at 98, 104. 
50. 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973). 
51. Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261. 
52. 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985). 
53. Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356. 
54. Id. at 1347. 
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class certification, referring to the fact that the injunction issued by the 
district court applied not only to the named plaintiff but to all Writs of 
Attachment issued by the defendant.55 Further, the court noted that 
"[w]hile apparently some writs may have been issued shortly after this 
injunction, the practice has now ceased and we understood at 
appellate argument that the [defendant] is issuing no more writs in any 
post-judgment attachment cases. Under the circumstances, we see no 
practical need for class certification. "56 
These cases all resulted in injunctions covering entire classes 
despite the lack of certification of a class action.57 Thus, in these 
particular cases class certification truly was not necessary: the same 
relief could be and was granted without class certification. But each 
appellate court based its conclusion that class certification was not 
necessary on the relief actually granted, something that did not come 
to light until after the district court issued its injunction, well after the 
district court made its decision on class certification. Still, the court in 
Dionne suggested explicitly, and the other courts implicitly, that in 
future cases district courts should take into account the ability to 
provide class relief without certifying a class.58 
2. The Difficult Situation of District Courts 
The lesson for district courts from the appellate cases is far from 
clear. The cases hold that denying class certification is permissible if 
class-wide relief is granted despite the court's refusal to certify a class, 
but do not suggest how the district court should go about determining 
what relief is likely to be granted while still making a determination on 
class certification in the appropriate time frame. Because appellate 
courts have not been required to rule on the propriety of the 
application of the necessity doctrine at the time of class certification,59 
district courts operate with little guidance from appellate courts at that 
55. Id. at 1356. 
56. Id. at 1356-57. 
57. In Martinez, persons who were not parties to the original case made use of the 
judgment. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. In Galvan, the parties were directed 
to settle an order and judgment, and the appellate court held that the judgment bound the 
government with respect to all claimants. Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1259, 1261 (2d 
Cir. 1973). In Dionne, the plaintiff sought a "permanent injunction" and the lower court's 
order "enjoined (the defendant] from issuing writs of attachment pursuant to the existing 
forms and procedures insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion." Dionne v. Bouley, 
583 F. Supp. 307, 309, 319 (D.R.I. 1984). 
58. See Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356. The other cases did not give explicit instructions to 
future district courts, but their role as precedent in their respective circuits suggests that 
district courts should look to them for guidance when making decisions about class 
certification that implicate the necessity doctrine. 
59. See supra note 39. 
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stage of the proceedings. District courts know very little about the 
facts of cases when they are deciding whether to certify a class because 
they must determine whether to maintain class actions without first 
investigating the merits of plaintiffs' claims.60 
Although recent changes to Rule 23 have removed the 
requirement that courts make rulings on class certification "as soon as 
practicable," the Advisory Committee advocating the rule change 
noted that "an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not 
properly part of the certification decision,"61 and that discovery prior 
to the decision on class certification should be "limited to those 
aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed 
basis. "62 Thus, while the Advisory Committee did anticipate more 
leeway for district courts to delay a decision on class certification, the 
Committee did not suggest that the probable outcome on the merits 
should be determined before the decision on class certification.63 
The amended Rule 23 recognizes the potential for changes after 
the class certification decision by permitting alteration of the class 
certification order before final judgment.64 But conducting a post-hoc 
inquiry into exactly whom the named plaintiff does and does not 
represent does not comport with the logic of Rule 23, which provides 
mechanisms for the interests of absent class members to be considered 
as the case proceeds.65 Further, while Rule 23 contemplates changes to 
the class as the case progresses,66 it does not contemplate a post-hoc 
reversal of an initial refusal to certify a class. 
In some cases, it may initially appear that all putative class 
members would benefit from a judgment even without class 
certification, but subsequent developments may make class-wide relief 
inappropriate in the absence of class certification. In Hurley v. Ward,67 
the Second Circuit held that class-wide relief was inappropriate absent 
60. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). The impact of recent 
amendments to Rule 23 is discussed infra. 
61. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(l) advisory committee's note (2003). 
62. Id. 
63. See id. Although, arguably, applying the necessity doctrine means that determining 
the scope of relief that may be granted is necessary to determine whether the case can 
proceed as a class action, an in-depth look into the merits does not comply with the 
suggestions of the advisory note or the text of the rule itself. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(l)(A) 
(requiring a decision on class certification at "an early practicable time"). 
64. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(l)(C); see also id. advisory committee's note (2003) ("A 
determination of liability after certification . . . may show a need to amend the class 
definition."). 
65. See, e.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (governing court approval of settlement in class 
actions to ensure that all the interests of class members are represented). 
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l)(C) ("An order under Rule 23(c)(l) [certifying a class] 
may be altered or amended before final judgment."). 
67. 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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class certification because there was not agreement on the typicality of 
the claim.68 The court distinguished Galvan by arguing that "[i]n 
Galvan and in other similar decisions, the constitutionality of a statute 
or administrative practice was in issue and the State conceded that the 
same legal question was posed by the application of the challenged 
statute or practice to all those within the purported class. "69 The court 
noted that "[t]he record in this case, as we have pointed out, focused 
upon [the individual plaintiff] and not the general prison 
population."70 But this record resulted from the failure to certify a 
class; had the class been certified, the course of the litigation would 
have changed and the record created would likely have better 
supported class-wide relief. 
In Hurley, the appellate court conducted its inquiry into whether 
class-wide relief was appropriate after hearings had been conducted 
with the case proceeding as an individual action, and therefore the 
case had focused on the individual circumstances of the named 
plaintiff.71 The resulting ina bility to grant class-wide relief illustrates 
the dangers of proceeding as though class relief will be availa ble 
without formally certifying a class. In addition, because the appellate 
decision came after the case had proceeded as an individual action, it 
does not give binding guidance to a district court making a decision on 
class certification at the outset of the litigation. 
Instead, district courts should conduct an inquiry into typicality of 
the claim at the beginning of the case.72 A court's decision whether to 
certify a class must be made "at an early practica ble time," as it may 
shape the rest of the litigation.73 Indeed, Rule 23 requires that an order 
certifying a class "define the class and the class claims, issues, or 
defenses."74 Denying class certification based on the necessity doctrine 
postpones or precludes this narrowing of the issues of the case, and 
can alter the scope of the litigation by eliminating some elements 
relevant to the class as a whole but not to the individual plaintiff .75 
In summary, district courts are left in a difficult position. They 
cannot, as the appellate courts do, refer to the relief granted in 
determining whether to apply the necessity doctrine because they do 
not yet know what relief will be granted. Thus, district courts are 
unlikely to be in a position to state definitively that class certification 
68. Hurley, 584 F.2d at 611-12. 
69. Id. at 611 (footnote omitted). 
70. Id. at 612 (emphasis added). 
71. See id. 
72. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring typicality for class certification). 
73. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(l)(A). 
74. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(l)(B). 
75. See, e.g., Hurley, 584 F.2d at 610. 
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is unnecessary, and should be especially cautious in invoking the 
necessity doctrine. The next Section argues that a district court's 
refusal to invoke the necessity doctrine does not contravene appellate 
precedent in favor of the doctrine. 
3. District Courts Retain Discretion to Find Necessity and Certify 
Classes 
Even if courts of appeals do not eliminate the necessity doctrine, 
district courts in all circuits retain the discretion to decline to invoke it. 
Courts of appeals that accept the necessity doctrine have not 
mandated that district courts refuse to certify classes. Instead, 
acceptance of the necessity doctrine consists of approving district 
courts' refusal to certify classes when, in the opinion of the district 
court, certification would not have served a useful purpose. Thus, 
district courts in all circuits remain free to certify classes should they 
deem class certification necessary in an individual case. 
The necessity doctrine cannot legitimately be characterized as a 
mandate in any circuit. As the district court noted in Baca/ v. 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,16 "courts of 
appeals appear to have only applied this approach when affirming the 
denial of a class certification, as opposed to when overruling a district 
court's decision to certify a class."77 Indeed, the Baca/ court 
questioned the degree to which its own circuit endorsed the necessity 
doctrine.78 The court noted that decisions subsequent to the Third 
Circuit's apparent approval of the necessity doctrine had cast doubt on 
the viability of the doctrine.79 In addition, the court noted the 
ambivalence expressed by the Third Circuit when it initially approved 
the doctrine in Carter v. Butz.80 Though the Carter opinion is 
commonly cited as supporting the necessity doctrine,81 the Carter court 
gave only a measured approval of the necessity doctrine, stating: 
"[t]he [district] court also concluded that the precedential value of its 
decision would render a judgment in favor of the class unnecessary. 
76. 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 707 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
77. Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712. Additional research by the author, 
reviewing cases both before and after Baca/, did not disclose any cases which would 
constitute exceptions to this principle. 
78. Id. at 712-13. 
79. Id. at 713 (citing Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238, 252 (3d 
Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 
43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
80. See Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712-13 (citing Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 
1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1973)). 
81. See, e.g. , Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (citing Carter, 479 F.2d at 1089). 
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While we might well have decided otherwise we conclude that the class 
action determination was within the range of discretion permitted by 
Rule 23."82 As one commentator observed, "like Newton's Law of 
Thermodynamics, for every class denial on the basis of lac� of need, 
one is able to find a decision, or several decisions, often in the same 
circuit, where other courts have certified Rule 23(b )(2) classes under 
virtually the same circumstances. "83 
This less-than-ringing endorsement of the necessity doctrine is not 
limited to the Third Circuit. As the Baca/ court pointed out, several 
other circuits have explicitly emphasized the discretion of the district 
court in approving some form of the necessity doctrine.84 For example, 
the First Circuit looks to the "discretion that the district court enjoys 
under the rule to deny class certification should it reasonably 
determine that class relief is not 'appropriate.' "85 Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit noted in a necessity doctrine case that "[t]he determination of 
class action status rests within the sound discretion of the district 
court. "86 And, as noted above, even circuits that have not stressed the 
discretion of district courts have not gone so far as to overturn a class 
certification on the basis of the necessity doctrine.87 
Thus, even in circuits in which appellate courts have strongly 
endorsed the necessity doctrine, district courts continue to have 
discretion to certify classes with little risk that certification will be 
overturned. As a consequence, the necessity doctrine does not 
constrain district courts, which remain free to examine the 
circumstances and determine that certification would serve a useful 
purpose in an individual case. To be sure, in circuits that have 
accepted the necessity doctrine, the district court must consider 
whether class certification is truly necessary. Still, no appellate court 
has overturned class certification on the ground that it was 
unnecessary.88 As a result, a district court that certifies a class because 
82. Carter, 479 F.2d at 1089 (emphasis added). The Baca/ court did not note this passage 
explicitly, but did suggest that Carter did not stand strongly for the necessity doctrine by 
stating that Carter "apparently approv[ed] the decision by a district court denying class 
certification on the basis that the precedential value of its decision would render a judgment 
in favor of the class unnecessary." Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712-13 (emphasis 
added). 
83. Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 
HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.19, at 4-62 (3d 
ed. 1992)). 
84. Baca/, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 712 (citing Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 
1356 (1st Cir. 1985); James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 
451 U.S. 355 (1981); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1 121, 1127 (10th Cir. 1973)). 
85. Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356. 
86. James, 613 F.2d at 186. 
87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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it perceives a necessity to do so does not disobey circuit court 
instruction to the contrary. Instead, such a district court exercises its 
discretion within the bounds articulated by the circuit court. 
In summary, the impact of the necessity doctrine comes down to 
whether the certification of a class affects the likelihood that the ruling 
will have broad application. If a ruling issued without class 
certification would be the same as the ruling that would issue with 
class certification and will be widely followed or easily enforced, class 
certification may truly be unnecessary. But if the defendant is 
prepared to fight to avoid certification, a more reasonable conclusion 
is that the defendant anticipates that class certification would have an 
impact on the content or scope of the ruling, or on the ease with which 
future litigants will be able to invoke the ruling to obtain equivalent 
relief. In such cases, class certification does make a difference and thus 
the necessity doctrine should not be invoked, particularly because 
district courts are not well-positioned to determine whether class relief 
will be available without certification. The future impact of failure to 
provide class-wide relief is the focus of Part I I. 
I I. T HE CONSEQUENCES OF F AILING TO PROVIDE CLASS-WIDE 
RELIEF 
Although the advantages are not quite as self-evident as when a 
group of plaintiffs all seek money damages from the same defendant, 
class certification is critical in cases where plaintiffs seek injunctive 
relief.89 First, plaintiffs have an opportunity to pool resources to obtain 
the best possible counsel.9? Second, the court can protect the interests 
of a whole group through court approval of settlements.91 Third, 
certifying classes enables anyone within the class to enforce the 
judgment.92 Finally, class actions help to avoid mooting of claims.93 
As discussed above, the third advantage listed - ability of 
unidentified class members to enforce court orders -is likely to be 
the most contentious issue for defendants.94 This Part shows why this 
89. In Nehmer v. United States Veterans' Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113, 119 (N.D. Cal. 1987), 
the court succinctly laid out these advantages, so the following summary follows that case 
closely. The advantages have also been well-rehearsed elsewhere, and thus are not limited to 
that case. See, e.g., Murphy & Butterfoss, supra note 11, at 1228-32 (discussing prejudgment 
problems with failure to certify classes); Talesnick, supra note 1 1, at 1040-44 (criticizing 
necessity doctrine on policy grounds). 
90. Nehmer, 118 F.R.D. at 1 19. 
91. Id.; see also supra note 37. 
92. Nehmer, 118 F.R.D. at 1 19. 
93. Id.; see also Murphy & Butterfoss, supra note 1 1, at 1229-30 (discussing mootness 
problems and giving examples). 
94. See supra Section I.A. 
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feature of class certification is also critical for putative class members. 
In particular, it argues that difficulties that future litigants will have in 
applying judgments suggest that the necessity doctrine should virtually 
never be invoked. 
The other factors listed above can preclude the use of the necessity 
doctrine in some instances,95 but may not be relevant in other cases 
and in any event have not been deemed sufficient to require a blanket 
rejection of the necessity doctrine.% These benefits have been fairly 
well-rehearsed over the history of Rule 23 and the necessity doctrine.97 
Thus, this Part focuses on a factor that has not been expressly 
considered by courts but will influence all necessity doctrine cases: the 
ability of future litigants to enforce the judgment. 
Section I I.A discusses the possibility that the government will 
decline to apply the ruling to nonparties, and the difficulties that such 
potential litigants will have in ensuring that the ruling is followed. 
Section I I.B notes the inadequacies of one possible alternative to class 
certification: a promise by the government to apply the ruling to all 
similarly situated people. 
A. Unavailability of Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel and the 
Possibility of Nonacquiescence 
In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. 
Mendoza,98 holding that nonmutual collateral estoppel could not be 
used against the federal govemment.99 Government agencies have 
taken advantage of this holding by reserving the right to decline to 
apply adverse judgments to parties who have not litigated through a 
process known as "agency nonacquiescence."100 Simply stated, agency 
nonacquiescence is "[t]he selective refusal of administrative agencies 
95. See, e.g., Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985) (limiting the 
applicability of the necessity doctrine in cases in which mootness may become an issue). 
96. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the continuing acceptance of the 
necessity doctrine in several circuits); see also Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1356 (continuing to apply 
the necessity doctrine in cases in which these factors are not deemed problematic). 
97. See, e.g., Murphy & Butterfoss, supra note 1 1, at 1228-32 (discussing prejudgment 
problems with failure to certify classes). 
98. 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
99. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162 ("We hold, therefore, that nonmutual offensive collateral 
estoppel simply does not apply against the Government in such a way as to preclude 
relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case."). Although Mendoza's holding has 
been narrowed by some rulings in lower courts, it has not been overruled by the Supreme 
Court and continues to be applied. Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Against States, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 792, 793 (1996). Lower courts have split on whether Mendoza's rationale 
applies to state governments as well. See id. at 803-04 (reviewing cases). 
100. For a thorough discussion of agency nonacquiescence, see Estreicher & Revesz I, 
supra note 17, and Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 17. 
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to conduct their internal proceedings consistently with adverse rulings 
of the courts of appeals. "101 Agencies have availed themselves of this 
option since the 1920s.102 There continues to be controversy about the 
appropriateness of agency nonacquiescence, at least when an agency 
disregards the judicial opinions of a court of appeals in cases within 
the same circuit.1 03 Although courts have roundly criticized the 
practice at least where it involves disregarding rulings of the circuit 
court in which a new plaintiff appears, 104 it continues to have 
some acceptance when agencies seek to create a uniform rule of 
law around the nation by challenging, through nonacquiescence, a 
circuit's rulings.105 
Although a full discussion of the appropriateness of agency 
nonacquiescence is beyond the scope of this Note, for the purposes of 
a district court determining whether to certify a class, it suffices to 
know that an agency, rightly or wrongly, might not apply a non-class 
101. Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 681. 
102. Id. Note that although Mendoza did not come down until 1984, the status of 
nonmutual collateral estoppel was sufficiently uncertain before then that it had not routinely 
been used against the government. See Note, supra note 99, at 792. 
103. Compare, e.g. , Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence 
and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 
801 (1990) (criticizing "intracircuit" nonacquiescence), with Estreicher & Revesz I, supra 
note 17, and Estreicher & Revesz II, supra note 17 (defending intracircuit nonacquiescence 
in some cases). 
104. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Stieberger, 
the court held that intracircuit nonacquiescence was not permitted in the case before it. Id. 
at 1356-57. The court noted that "[a]lthough not specifically dealt with by the Supreme 
Court, the SSA's non-acquiescence policy has been the subject of almost universal 
condemnation by those courts which have considered its legality." Id. at 1353. Other courts 
have been similarly critical. See, e.g. , Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 
1984), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984) (holding that "[f]ar from raising 
questions of judicial interference in executive actions, this case presents the reverse 
constitutional problem: the executive branch defying the courts and undermining what are 
perhaps the fundamental precepts of our constitutional system - the separation of powers 
and respect for the law," and "(t]hat the Secretary, as a member of the executive, is required 
to apply federal law as interpreted by the federal courts cannot seriously be doubted"); see 
also Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 699 (describing Lopez and Stieberger as 
"representative of the judicial rebuke that intracircuit nonacquiescence by SSA has 
engendered"). 
105. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 753 ("We have shown that intracircuit 
nonacquiescence is justifiable only when it is employed as an interim measure that allows the 
agency to maintain a uniform administration of its governing statute while it makes 
reasonable attempts to persuade the courts to validate its preferred policy."). Even the 
Stieberger court accepted this: 
Intra-circuit non-acquiescence in a circuit court decision also might be less troublesome if 
utilized where the agency has substantial reason to believe that subsequent consideration of 
the disputed issue in other forums has created conditions which are likely to lead either to 
reconsideration by the circuit court in question or to Supreme Court review. 
Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1366. 
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judgment to other similarly situated people.106 Although 
nonacquiescence may not be a desirable agency policy, courts' refusal 
or inability to eliminate it suggests that it is a legitimate concern for 
other putative class members. The ability of agencies to decline to 
apply a judgment is particularly problematic for poor plaintiffs who 
may have difficulty accessing the judicial system.107 And 
nonacquiescence, combined with the inability to apply nonmutual 
collateral estoppel, suggests that other putative plaintiffs may not 
benefit from the judgment unless a class is certified. 
Proponents of nonacquiescence have argued that circuit-wide class 
certification cuts off the benefits of nonacquiescence because it 
prevents government challenges to a judicial decision through 
nonacquiescence.108 But this justification only applies in a very limited 
set of circumstances, when the gove rnment is actively trying to change 
the law in a given area.109 When the government simply attempts to 
limit the consequences of an adverse ruling, the rationale for allowing 
nonacquiescence does not apply.110 In addition, denying class 
certification on these grounds goes far beyond the necessity doctrine; 
rather than arguing that certification is not necessary because the 
same result would be achieved either way, courts following this 
reasoning would be accepting that certification is imprudent because it 
would lead to a different result. 
Further, certifying a class does not lock the court into a wide ­
sweeping judgment. Because the relief sought is equitable, the court 
retains discretion to shape the order to guard against overbreadth, or 
to allow reexamination of the ruling if the circumstances change.111 For 
examp le, Rule 60(b ) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
the court to "relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... any ... reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment."112 In addition, as the 
106. For examples of agency nonacquiescence, see Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, 
at 699-702, 706-10. For example, the Social Security Administration terminated disability 
benefits in some cases despite cases from the court of appeals that would have required 
more evidence of improvement in physical condition before benefits were terminated. Id. at 
699-700. 
107. See supra note 6. 
108. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 753 ("While a court that had 
previously ruled against the agency could continue to set aside agency action inconsistent 
with the previous rule, it could not enjoin the agency from engaging in intracircuit 
nonacquiescence in accordance with this standard (or accomplish the same end by certifying 
a circuit-wide class action including future litigants)."). 
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
1 10. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
1 11. See, e.g. , FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(l)(C) (allowing amendment of the definition of the 
class); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (allowing amendment of final judgment or order). 
1 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
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commentary accompanying the most recent revision of Rule 23 
indicates, certifying a class does not require granting a s weeping 
judgment : " A  determination of liability after certification, ho wever, 
may sho w a need to amend the class definition. Decertification may be 
warranted after further proceedings."113 Thus, courts that certify 
classes keep the full range of options open. 
B. The Value of Promises to Apply the Ruling Broadly 
Some courts, perhaps recog mz mg the possibility of 
nonacquiescence, have approved application of the necessity doctrine 
on the basis of a promise by the agency to apply the ruling to the 
entire class.114 Acceptance of these promises as a substitute for class 
certification can lead to difficulties in future cases. Plaintiffs cannot be 
assured that these promises have any binding effect, and they 
therefore constitute a poor substitute for a ruling that applies to the 
entire class. Section B. 1 contends that courts are unlikely to enforce 
such government promises. Section B.2 discusses the shortcomings of 
a regime in which such promises are given binding effect, and argues 
that instead district courts should abandon the necessity doctrine. 
1. Unlikelihood of Binding Effect 
Government promises to apply a judgment to similarly situated 
plaintiffs cannot be assured of having binding legal effect. The issue of 
what circumstances would allo w promises by the government in one 
case to be binding in future litigation remains open to question. 115 
Thus, absent assurances that the government 's promise will have 
113. FED. R. crv. P. 23(c)(l) advisory committee's note (2003). 
114. See, e.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The State has made 
clear that it understands the judgment to bind it with respect to all claimants; indeed even 
before entry of the judgment, it withdrew the challenged policy even more fully than the 
court ultimately directed and stated it did not intend to reinstate the policy."). Later cases 
reveal that this promise was not merely an additional factor, but a requirement. Boyland v. 
Wing, No. 92-CV-1002, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7496, at *35 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 2001) 
(quoting with approval plaintiffs' observation that '"over the last 25 years . . .  federal courts 
in New York have routinely departed from Galvan when "State and City defendants have 
not given the type of assurance that was given in Galvan""' (alteration in original) (quoting 
Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No. 95-CV-0641 ,  1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22373 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 
1996)); see also D.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-03-2489, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5189, at *42-45 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) (listing government acquiescence in 
applying relief across the board among factors in deciding whether to invoke the necessity 
doctrine). 
115. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) ("[T]he circumstances 
under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to 
any general formulation of principle." (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 
(4th Cir. 1982)) ); see also infra note 118 and accompanying text (noting that judicial estoppel 
is even less likely against government litigants). 
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binding effect, these promises constitute a poor substitute for a court 
order encompassing the entire class. 
Although the doctrine of judicial estoppel would make a promise 
binding if a nongove rnmental litigant were involved, the doctrine is 
not necessarily available against the government.116 In New Hampshire 
v. Maine, the Supreme Court accepted that "[t]he doctrine of judicial 
estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding 
that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous 
proceeding. "117 Still, the Court ackno wledged that judicial estoppel 
would not ordinarily apply to govern ment litigants, although the case 
before it constituted an exception. 118 
One major concern with estoppel against the government, 
articulated in United States v. Mendoza,119 was that the government 
should have the freedom to alter its policies and to relitigate 
previously decided legal issues.120 In New Hampshire v. Maine,121 the 
Court echoed these concerns in discussing judicial estoppel, noting 
that " [  o ]f course, 'broad interests of public policy may make it 
important to allo w a change of positions that might seem 
inappropriate as a matter of merely private interests. "'122 The same 
argument has been offered in favor of allo wing nonacquiescence: that 
the government should have the opportunity to attempt to overrule 
previous judicial decisions. 123 In light of these concerns, a court is 
unlikely to hold the government to a promise to be bound by a 
previous ruling. 
A related concern in the Supreme Court's treatment of estoppel 
against the government involves the ability of a single government 
116. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 749, 755. 
117. Id. at 749 (quoting 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
134.30 (3d ed. 2000)). But see Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 
264, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that judicial estoppel should be limited to factual 
assertions). In any event, as discussed infra, putative class members cannot rely on judicial 
estoppel. 
118. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 755. New Hampshire v. Maine itself involved 
a dispute over the border between New Hampshire and Maine. Id. at 745. The Court held 
that New Hampshire v. Maine constituted an exception to the general rule against judicial 
estoppel of government litigants because the case did not arise out of a change in public 
policy, which the governmental exception is designed to allow, and applying estoppel would 
not prevent the states from enforcing their laws. Id. at 755. 
119. 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
120. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161. 
121. 532 U.S. 742 (2001). 
122. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 755 (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4477 (1981)). The Court went on to note that 
the normal prohibition on estoppel against governments did not apply in the case before it 
because it was not an example of a single government agent binding the whole government, 
or of a change in government policy. Id. 
123. See Estreicher & Revesz I, supra note 17, at 738-39. 
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agent to bind the entire government. In Office of Personnel 
Management v. Richmond,124 the Court noted the problems that could 
arise from allowing estoppel based on the assertion of one of the 
multitude of government employees.125 Although it may appear that a 
promise by a government attorney in open court would be more likely 
to be binding, the Supreme Court has emphasized the difference 
between agency actions and statements by agency counsel in the 
course of litigation in terms of the deference they are due.126 
Finally, the acceptance of government promises to abide by rulings 
in necessity doctrine cases did not presume that these promises had 
binding effect, but instead were premised on the notion that 
trustworthy government actors would not make such a promise unless 
they intended to abide by it.127 In Dionne v. Bouley, for example, the 
court applied the necessity doctrine because " [t]he court could 
reasonably assume the good faith of a defendant such as the Chief 
Clerk of a state court especially given his express willingness to follow 
the court's injunction."128 In Dionne, the court explicitly ruled that 
classes should be certi fied "where the good faith of the loser cannot be 
fairly presumed. "129 
The court in Dionne did not offer an explanation for the 
interjection of a court's determination of the likelihood that the 
defendant will proceed in good faith.130 The reliance on the perceived 
good faith of the government is particularly problematic given that the 
government is less likely to be held to that requirement of good faith 
in subsequent proceedings . One can imagine a court's declining to 
certify a class when the defendant would have incentive to abide by 
the ruling because of the fear of being subject to nonmutual collateral 
estoppel in a subsequent case.131 But, as discussed above, the 
gove rnment would not be subject to nonmutual collateral estoppel.132 
124. 496 U.S. 414 (1990). 
125. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 433. 
126. See, e.g. , Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) (declining 
to give deference to an interpretation by agency counsel, deeming it merely the "agency's 
convenient litigating position"). 
127. See, e.g. , Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1357 (1st Cir. 1985); Hurley v. Ward, 584 
F.2d 609, 61 1-12 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Since it is ordinarily assumed that state officials will abide 
by the court's judgment, where the State has admitted the identity of issues as to all potential 
class litigants class certification is indeed unnecessary."). 
128. Dionne, 757 F.2d at 1357. 
129. Id. at 1356. 
130. See id. 
131. Such a fear would, of course, be justified for a nongovernmental litigant. See 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing offensive nonmutual collateral 
estoppel). 
132. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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Further, the government has demonstrated a w ill ingness to decl ine to 
ab ide by court rul ings through nonacqu iescence.133 Thus, all else be ing 
equal, even if a government ent ity makes a prom ise, one would expect 
a court to be more skept ical that the government w ill follow the rul ing 
in the future w ith no add it ional jud ic ial superv is ion. 
In summary, pla int iffs do not have good reason to bel ieve that 
prom ises by government ent it ies to apply rul ings broadly w ill be 
bind ing. Even if the prom ise is indeed made in good fa ith, a pla int iff 
has no guarantee that the pol icy of accept ing the rul ing w ill not be 
changed in the future, a poss ib il ity spec if ically contemplated and 
accepted by the courts.134 
2 .  Problems with Holding the Government to Its Promises 
As d iscussed in the prev ious Sect ion, the l ikel ihood of future 
courts hold ing the gove rnment to its prom ise to apply the rul ing 
broadly is low. Th is Sect ion contends that hold ing governments to 
these prom ises would const itute an infer ior alternat ive to cert if icat ion 
under Rule 23. Such a pol icy would str ip both part ies of the 
protect ions inherent in class act ion l it igat ion. 
Even if the government is prepared to apply the rul ing broadly, the 
informal nature of the prom ise removes several important procedural 
safeguards. If a court intends to apply the rul ing broadly, other 
putat ive class members should rece ive adequate representat ion 135 and 
court approval of settlements to assure that any settlement serves the 
interests of all class members.136 Rule 23 mandates that these 
procedures be followed in class act ions ; adjud icat ing a case affect ing a 
broad class of persons w ithout its protect ion const itutes an end run 
around these procedures.137 
In add it ion, rely ing on a prom ise from a government ent ity allows 
that government ent ity to determ ine the scope of the rul ing. In 
contrast, Rule 23 reserves for the court the r ight to determ ine the s ize 
and def in it ion of the class and the issues included in the class act ion.138 
Th is d ist inct ion could have a s ign if icant effect on the impact of the 
ruling if the group defined by the governmental prom ise d iffers from 
the class that the court would cert ify. 
133. See supra section II.A. 
134. See supra notes 1 19-123 and accompanying text. 
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g). 
136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(l)(A). 
137. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
138. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(l)(B) ("An order certifying a class action must define the 
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule 
23(g)."). 
1040 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1018 
Finally, even if government promises were to have any value to 
future putative plaintiffs, governments would probably very rapidly 
cease making them. If the government makes a binding promise to 
apply a court's ruling broadly, it in essence increases the scope of the 
ruling. At the conclusion of the case, rather than making a judgment 
applicable only to the litigants in the case, the court, if it finds for the 
plaintiff, will in effect be making a judgment for all potential litigants. 
The government will almost certainly respond to such a regime by 
ceasing to make such promises. As discussed earlier, defendants 
opposing class actions are primarily interested in limiting the scope of 
relief.139 If the method of opposing the class action automatically 
extends the scope of relief, it will no longer appeal to defendants, 
particularly because the relief will be asymmetrical -if the defendant 
prevails, it cannot use the judgment against other potential plaintiffs 
who did not litigate the original case. 140 
In summary, extracting a promise from a government atto rney that 
the government will apply the ruling more broadly does not solve any 
of the problems with the necessity doctrine. If, as is likely, the promise 
were not binding, future litigants would have nothing to rely on if the 
government changed its view and refused to abide by the ruling in a 
future case. If the promise were binding in future litigation, the 
government would be in the same position after the case ended as it 
would have been if the class had been certified, but without the 
safeguards built into Rule 23 that protect absent class members. 
C ONCLUSION 
The necessity doctrine, although ostensibly about conserving 
judicial resources, is really used by defendants as a tool to limit the 
scope of the judgment. Application of the necessity doctrine has the 
potential to prevent putative class members from benefiting from a 
favorable judgment. Consequently, failure to certify a class can have a 
significant adverse impact on future litigants, particularly those who 
lack the resources to instigate a new actio n. Especially in the current 
environment, in which government agencies continue to engage in 
nonacquiescence and offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel is 
unavailable against them, protecting these litigants should be a 
primary concern of the courts. 
Even if appellate courts do not reverse their necessity doctrine 
jurisprudence, district courts retain the discretion to decline to invoke 
the necessity doctrine and to certify classes to protect future litigants. 
139. See supra Section I.A. 
140. Indeed, this approaches the scenario that Professor Wilton contemplated in arguing 
that class certification only helps defendants. See Wilton, supra note 23, at 603. 
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District courts shoul d utilize that discretion an d ensure that their 
ju dgments are respecte d. 
1042 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1018 
